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Michael A. Salinger and Lawrence H. Summers 
This paper develops a methodology for simulating the effects of alterna- 
tive corporate tax reforms on the stock market valuation and investment 
plans of individual firms. The methods are applied to estimate the effects 
of alternative corporate tax reforms on the thirty Dow Jones companies. 
The estimates are all based on extensions of Tobin’s q theory of  invest- 
ment to take account of the effects of tax policy. As well as providing the 
basis for the estimates of the effects of tax policy, the results here provide 
strong microeconometric support for the q theory of investment. The q 
theory approach provides a superior method for estimating the effects of 
investment incentives because it recognizes the effects of changes in the 
cost of  capital on the desired level of  output. 
A central concern in the design of tax policy is the avoidance of windfall 
gains or losses. This concern is closely related to the goal of providing 
incentives only at the margin. A crucial virtue of  the q approach em- 
ployed here is that it provides a clear delineation of  the impact of  tax 
policies on the market value of existing capital as well as of new capital. It 
thus allows an examination of the incidence of tax changes on the holders 
of  different assets. This represents an important extension of  the inci- 
dence concepts usually used in public finance, which focus only on the 
rate of  return on capital with  no consideration  of  the wealth effects 
caused by short-run changes in its relative price. 
The interaction of  inflation and the corporate tax system has received 
widespread attention in recent years.  As is by  now well understood, 
inflation affects the corporate tax system in three important ways. His- 
toric cost  depreciation  and firms’ reluctance  to use  LIFO inventory 
accounting cause inflation to raise the tax burden on corporate capital. 
Michael A.  Salinger and Lawrence H. Summers are with the Massachusetts Institute of 
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This is offset by the deductibility of  nominal rather than real interest 
payments. While the impact of these interactions of inflation and the tax 
system on aggregate investment and stock market valuation  has been 
discussed extensively, their effect on the behavior of individual firms has 
been little studied. Even if indexing the tax system had little effect on the 
level of aggregate investment or the stock market, the results in this paper 
suggest that it would have a large impact on the composition of invest- 
ment among firms. Full indexing of the corporate tax system, for exam- 
ple, would raise the Dow Jones average by about 8%.  The effects of the 
investment experience of  individual firms would vary substantially. 
The first section of  the paper outlines the q theory of  investment that 
provides the basis for the simulations reported in this paper. The analysis 
draws on the work of  Hayashi (1982) and Abel(l979) in linking the  Tobin 
q  approach to investment with  the firm’s problem of  determining an 
optimal investment path in the presence of  adjustment costs. In particu- 
lar, it shows how an investment equation relating the level of investment 
to  tax-adjusted q can be used to infer the shape of a firm’s adjustment cost 
function. The q theory provides  an improved basis for estimating the 
effects of  tax reform on investment because the process of adjustment is 
modeled explicitly. 
The estimation of  q investment equations for the thirty Dow Jones 
companies is discussed in the second section. These estimates require the 
estimation of  a time series of  tax-adjusted q for each company. These are 
developed  using Compustat data. The time series estimates are quite 
supportive of the q theory. The data confirm the importance of  the tax 
adjustments to q suggested by the theory. 
In the third section, the impact of  alternative tax returns on q and 
investment is examined. This requires calculating the present value of the 
expected change in revenue which would result from alternative reforms. 
It is also possible to calculate the impact of these policies on the market 
value of  individual firms’ equity. The results suggest that some reforms 
could have potent effects. Complete indexing would raise the Dow Jones 
average by an estimated 7.6%. The variance among companies is sub- 
stantial, with the effect ranging from -  13% for Sears to 20% for Amer- 
ican Brands. 
The fourth section combines the results of  the preceding sections to 
provide evidence on the response of  investment  to indexing the tax 
system and to various reforms. The results suggest that, because adjust- 
ment costs are very large, tax reforms are likely to have a much larger 
impact on long-run capital intensity than on investment in the short run. 
The results of the q theory approach are contrasted with those obtained 
using other methods. 
A fifth (and final) section reviews some limitations of the analysis and 
suggests directions for future research. 249  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
8.1 
This section describes the procedure developed in Summers (19814 
for using investment equations involving Tobin’s q as a basis for estimat- 
ing the impact of  tax policies on both investment and the stock market. 
Here the focus is on the investment decisions of individual firms. The 
essential insight underlying Tobin’s theory is that in a taxless world, firms 
will  invest so long as each dollar spent purchasing capital raises  the 
market value of  the firm by  more than one dollar.  Tobin goes on to 
assume that as a good approximation the market value of  an additional 
unit of  capital equals the average market value of  the existing capital 
stock. That is, the value of the marginal “q” on an additional dollar of 
investment is well proxied by average q,  which is the ratio of the market 
value of  the capital stock to its replacement cost. It is natural then to 
assume that the rate  of  investment  is  an increasing  function  of  the 
marginal return to investment as proxied by q. 
An approach of this type has several virtues relative to other standard 
approaches to explaining investment. Perhaps most  important, the q 
theory approach is supply oriented. In the formulation presented below, 
firms make output and capital intensity decisions simultaneously. This 
captures the essence of an important channel through which investment 
stimuli are supposed to work. By reducing the cost of  one factor of 
production, firms are encouraged to supply more output. This channel is 
obscured in most of the standard econometric approaches to investment 
decision making, in which the level of  output is taken as predetermined. 
In this section, we show that the q theory of  investment can be derived 
from the assumption that firms face adjustment costs and make invest- 
ment decisions optimally with the objective of  maximizing market value. 
Output along with investment is treated as a choice variable. 
A second virtue of  the q theory approach is that it can be used to 
evaluate a  wider  menu  of  policy  proposals  than  standard methods. 
Almost all of  the empirical literature on tax policy and investment ne- 
glects entirely taxes levied at the personal level. These are difficult to 
introduce into investment  equations of  the flexible  accelerator type. 
Since they do  affect stock market values, they are easily handled by the q 
theory approach. In addition, because the q theory is derivable directly 
from the assumption of  intertemporal optimization,  it can be used to 
evaluate the effects of  policy  announcements and temporary policies. 
The  approach is forward looking and so can be used to  study the effects of 
future policies on current investment. As Robert Lucas has emphasized, 
standard econometric  investment equations  cannot be used to predict the 
effects of any fundamental changes in policy.’ The approach developed 
Taxes in a q Theory of Investment 
1. This criticism applies at two levels. First, most standard approaches of the type used in 
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here is immune from this criticism because the only parameters which are 
estimated are technological and do not depend on the policy rule. 
In what follows, the behavior of  a representative, competitive firm 
seeking to maximize the market value of  its equity is considered. We 
begin by examining how individuals value corporate stock and then turn 
to the firm’s decision problem. Throughout, it is assumed that firms 
neither issue new equity nor repurchase existing shares.* Hence share 
prices are proportional to the outstanding value of  a firm’s equity. We 
assume that equity holders require a fixed real after-tax return p in order 
to induce them to hold the outstanding equity. The approach here is 
partial equilibrium in that the required rate of  return is assumed to be 
unaffected by changes in tax policy. While this assumption is obviously 
appropriate for an individual firm, its relevance to an economy-wide tax 
change is less clear. However, Summers (1981a, b)  argues that any effects 
of tax reforms on the required rate of return are likely to be minor and of 
ambiguous sign. The required return p is the sum of the capital gains and 
dividends net of  tax. It follows that 
(1)  (p + IT)K  = (1 -  c)k + (1 -  OD)Div , 
where c represents the effective accrual rate of taxation on capital gains,’ 
OD the tax rate on dividends, and IT the rate of inflation. Differences in the 
tax rates faced by different investors are ignored. To solve this differen- 
tial equation it is necessary to impose a transversality condition. We do 
this by  requiring that at time t 
This condition precludes the possibility of  an explosive solution to (1). 
With the transversality condition satisfied and the assumption of per- 
fect foresight, the solution to (1) becomes 
(3)  -  OD Div exp [ -js*  du]  ds 
1-c  ‘ 1-c 
way to use them to contemplate the effect of an announced change in policy. Implicitly, they 
assume that all tax parameters are expected  to remain permanently  constant. Second, 
because  expected tax changes are an important feature of  the historic experience,  the 
equations are misspecified so that parameter estimates are unlikely to be reliable.  The 
substantial importance of  these problems is demonstrated by the simulations below. 
2.  Under the conditions described below, firms would never want to issue new equity. 
Legal restrictions severely limit firms’ ability to repurchase their own shares. A discussion of 
these restrictions and the limitations of  other mechanisms which might seem to be func- 
tionally equivalent to repurchasing shares is contained in Auerbach (1979). For the issues 
considered  here the assumption  that shares are not  repurchased  is not  likely to have 
important effects. 
3.  This corresponds to the statutory rate adjusted for deferral and the lack of  construc- 
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In the steady state, where taxes, the price level, and dividends are held 
constant, this expression reduces to 
(4) 
(1 -  OD)Div 
P 
V= 
In this case capital gains taxes do not matter because there are no capital 
gains. More generally, as in (3), capital gains taxes raise the discount rate 
on future dividends as well as affect the valuation of current dividends. 
Note that equation (3) implies that because of  dividend taxes an extra 
dollar of  promised dividends raises share valuation only by (1 -  OD). 
The firm seeks to choose an investment and financial policy to maxi- 
mize (3) subject to the constraints it faces. It is constrained by its initial 
capital stock and by a requirement that sources equal uses of  funds. It will 
also be necessary to assume that credit market constraints do not permit 
the firm to finance more than a fraction of  its investment with debt.4  This 
can be thought of  as a measure of the firm’s debt capacity. In the model 
presented below,  the firm will  always  choose  to  borrow  as  much  as 
possible; we assume that a share b of all new investment comes from debt 
issues and the remainder is financed through retained earnings. Finally, 
the firm cannot change its capital stock costlessly. The cost of  installing 
extra capital is assumed to rise with the rate of  capital accumulation. For 
convenience,  it  is  assumed that the cost  function  is convex  and ho- 
mogeneous in investment and capital. Under these conditions dividends 
may be derived as after-tax profits less investment expenses.s That is, 
(5)  Div = [pF(K,L)  -  wL  -pbiK](l -  T) -  [l -  ITC -  b 
+ (1 -  ~)+]pl+  TD  +  pbK(n -  6R)  , 
where K and L refer to factor inputs,p is the overall price level, F(K,L)  is 
the production function, w  is the wage rate,  i is the nominal interest rate, 
T is the corporate tax rate, ITC is the investment  tax credit, 4 is the 
adjustment cost function, I represents investment, 6R  is the real rate of 
depreciaton  ,  and D represents the value of currently allowable deprecia- 
tion allowances. It has been assumed that adjustment costs are expensed 
and ineligible for the investment tax credit. 
The tax law is assumed to allow for exponential depreciation at a rate 
that may differ from aR  but to be based on historical cost. This implies 
that 
4.  This is acrude way of modeling the effects of bankruptcy costs on the firm’s choice of a 
debt-equity ratio. As noted below, the assumption of a constant debt-capital ratio is a fairly 
good representation of  recent American experience. McDonald (1980) treats the choice of 
financial policy in more detail. 
5. The assumption here is that all marginal equity finance comes from retained earnings. 
This follows from the assumption made earlier of  a constant number of  shares. It accounts 
for some of  the apparently  paradoxical results described below. The last term reflects the net 
receipts from new debt issues (withdrawals) necessary to maintain the debt-capital ratio as 
the capital stock depreciates and the price level rises. 252  Michael A. Salinger/Lawrence H. Summers 
(6) 
Combining equations (3) and (5),  making use of  (6), and rearranging 
yield an expression for the value of  a firm's equity at time t: 
(7) 
0,  = c6*puZuexp[ -  ST(s -  u)]  du . 
=  Jm[  [pF(K,L)  -  WL  -  pbKi](l -  T) 
-  [l -  ITC -  Z, -  b 
+ (1 -  T)+]pl+  pbK(n -  8)] 
(l -  '")FS  ds + B, . 
(1 -  c)Pr 
All the tax parameters can be arbitrary functions of  time. For ease of 
exposition the following symbols have been introduced: 
s p+7T 
ps = exp [ -j  O  -du]  1-C 
CD 
2, =  ~6~exp[  -  6T(u -  s)]h  du . 
CLS 
These rather formidable expressions have simple interpretations. B,  rep- 
resents the present value of  depreciation allowances on existing capital. 
2, is the present value, evaluated at the time of the investment, on a 
dollar of  new investment. In maximizing (7) the firm can ignore B,, since 
it is independent of  any future decisions. The  constraint faced by the firm 
in maximizing (7) is that capital accumulation equals net investment: 
(9)  K, = Zs -  sRK, . 
The first-order conditions for optimality are6 
6.  Assuming that adjustment expenses were treated as investment under the tax law 
would not importantly alter the results. If  these costs are taken to represent  managerial 
effort, or as  interference with concurrent production, the assumption in the text is appropri- 
ate. Similar conditions differing because of  assumptions about taxation have been derived 
by Hayashi (1981) and Abel (1982). 253  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
(1 -  0”) 
(1 -  c) 
(1 -  T)+’ + b(n -  S”)] 
Equation (lob) characterizes the investment function. It implicitly de- 
fines a function linking investment to the shadow price of capital Alp, and 
the tax parameters. The condition for zero investment is that 
--  A -  (’ -  e”) [l -  ITC -  2, -  b] . 
Pf  (1 -  4 
This result can be characterized in intuitive terms. It implies that the 
shadow price of additional capital goods is equated to their marginal cost 
in after-tax dollars. Equation (11) implies that there will be investment 
even if the shadow price of new capital goods is less than 1. This is because 
taxes and debt finance reduce the effective price of  new capital goods. 
Equation (lob) is of  no operational significance as a theory of  invest- 
ment unless an observable counterpart to the shadow price Alp, can be 
developed.  Hayashi  (1982) has shown in  a similar model with a less 
elaborate tax  system how  the shadow price is linked  to the market 
valuation  of  existing capital.  The  derivation  below follows his  very 
closely. Equation (7) implies that 
Pt  Kt 
-  (1 -  ITC -  2, -  b + (1 -  T)+)Z 
K 
using  the  definition  of  p. The first-order  conditions  (10) imply that 
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Now, using the first-order condition for A, it can be seen that 
x exp [ -S(P.--  n --+  I  SR) du] 




The shadow  price  of  additional  capital  may  thus  be expressed  as  a 
function  of  the firm’s market value. The term  B, is subtracted  from 
market value since the depreciation allowances the firm will receive on 
existing capital provide no inducement to further investment. Substitut- 
ing equation (14) in equation (lob)  yields an investment function express- 
ible entirely in terms of  observables: 
-  1 + b + ITC + Z 
(V-B)(1-c) 
pK(1 -  OD) 
(1 -  T) 
---  I-K+gR=h 
KK 
where h( ) = (+ + (I/K) +‘) - ’. Equation (15) is a structural investment 
function relating investment and stock market valuation. 
For simplicity we postulate that up to some level of  I/  K,  adjustment is 
costless. Above that level, marginal adjustment costs rise linearly with 
investment. That is, total adjustment costs are 
=O 
It follows that the function +( ) is given by 
which  is homogeneous  in  I  and K as required.  This implies that the 
investment function (15) can be written as 
I  1 
-=  h(Q) = 
K  P  + -  Q, 
where Q represents tax-adjusted Tobin’s q and is given by 255  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
By estimating equation (18) the parameters of  the adjustment cost func- 
tion +( ) can be inferred. This is the approach taken in the next section. 
Before turning to the data, it is necessary to highlight the restrictive- 
ness of  the assumptions under which the stock market provides a proxy 
for the marginal q which drives investment decisions. The  crucial assump- 
tion in the preceding  derivation  is that capital is both malleable and 
homogeneous. Only with this technological assumption does the market 
value of  existing capital provide a proxy for the increment to market 
value arising from new investment. The assumption made here is incon- 
sistent with putty-clay formulations in which existing capital can only be 
used in fixed proportions while new capital is malleable. It is also incon- 
sistent with the view that the recent energy shocks have reduced the 
market value of existing energy-intensive capital but raised the incentive 
to invest in new energy-conserving capital. 
A second restrictive assumption is that firms produce with constant 
returns to scale and earn no rents. If firms earn rents because of  decreas- 
ing  returns,  intangible  investments, or market  power,  these  will  be 
reflected in their market value and so measured q will not be a satisfactory 
proxy for the return to investment. 
While these limitations are severe, they are in no way unique to the q 
theoretic approach to investment. Exactly the same issues arise in con- 
nection with variants on the flexible accelerator approach. 
8.2  Construction of the Tax-adjusted Q Variable 
This section presents estimates of  the Q investment equations which 
provide the basis for an estimate of  the impact of  tax policy. With the 
early exception of Grunfeld (1960), almost all the empirical work using q 
has focused on aggregate or industry investment. Little or no account has 
been taken of  tax effects.  The construction  of  the necessary data is 
described in the appendix. The equations were estimated for the thirty 
Dow Jones companies. 
In table 8.1, estimates of Tobin's q ratio of the market value of the firm 
to the replacement cost of  its capital stock are displayed along with the 
tax-adjusted variant of Q for the companies included in the sample. Note 
that Q is the shadow price of capital less its acquisition cost. It is therefore 
comparable to q -  1 rather than q. The magnitudes of  the estimates 
appear plausible. Moreover, companies whose prospects look dim, such 
as the steel companies, have low values of  q whereas companies with 
rapid  growth  prospects,  such as IBM, have high values of  q. In all 256  Michael A. Salinger/Lawrence H. Summers 
Table 8.1  1978 y and Q 
Company  Y  Q 
Allied Chemical 
Aluminum Company of  America 
American Brands 
American Can 
American Telephone & Telegraph 
Bethlehem Steel 













Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
Owens-Illinois 
Proctor & Gamble 
Sears 
Standard  Oil of  California 
Texaco 














































-  ,181 
-  ,022 
9.845 














-  .222 
-  ,807 
likelihood, the high values of  q  for some companies also reflect the 
market’s  valuation  of  intangible  assets.  Lindenberg and Ross (1981) 
estimated q in a fashion similar to the estimates in this paper. They report 
eighteen year averages of q for each company. The correlation between 
the two sets of estimates of eighteen year averages of q for the twenty-five 
firms common  to both  samples is  0.953.  On average, however, our 
estimates of  q tend to be higher than theirs. We assume that capital 
depreciates faster than they do. Their calculations of  capital-augmenting 
technical change only partially offset the difference in the depreciation 
rates. In estimating q,  one needs to make many arbitrary assumptions. 
The high correlation between the two studies suggests that these assump- 
tions have more of  an effect on the level than on the variations in q. 
Theory, failing to take account of taxes, suggests that firms should not 
invest when q is less than 1. This is the case for most of the firms in the 
sample. Only for a much smaller fraction of the sample is the tax-adjusted 257  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
mcasure Q less than zero. The difference is due in large part to the fact 
that the Q measure takes account of  the effects of dividend taxes, which 
reduce the opportunity cost of corporate  retentions. Note, however, that 
even using this concept, eight companies appear to have no incentive to 
invest. The reason that these companies actually invest almost certainly 
involves  the  failure  of  the  assumption  made  here  that  capital  is 
homogeneous and malleable. In a world of  heterogeneous capital, even 
firms with very low market values will find some investment worthwhile. 
Estimates of  equation (18) for the thirty companies are shown in table 
8.2. The  equations  are all estimated  using ordinary  least squares. Because 
the estimates of Q are likely to  be less reliable for the earlier years in the 
sample, we used only the last  fifteen observations on each company. 
Some of  the equations do exhibit serial correlation. Rao and Griliches 
(1969) show that when the error process is first-order autoregressive and 
the  autocorrelation  coefficient  is  relatively  high  (generally  0.4  or 
greater), the GLS transformation can improve efficiency even in small 
samples. If  the error process is of  higher  order, then simply doing a 
first-order autoregressive transformation can reduce the efficiency of the 
estimator. With only fifteen data points, making higher-order autocor- 
relation corrections is not likely to improve efficiency, so we chose not to 
make any autoregressive transformations.  When there is positive serial 
correlation, however, the f statistics for the OLS estimates will be over- 
stated if we assume that the errors are white noise. Thus the t statistics 
reported are based on the assumption that the errors follow a first-order 
autoregressive process. 
The results support the Q theory. In twenty-eight of the thirty regres- 
sions,  the estimated slope coefficient is  positive.  Nearly  half  of  the 
estimates are statistically significant. The low R2  values indicate, how- 
ever, that much of what affects investment decisions is not captured by 
the Q variable.  The bottom rows of  the table report estimates of  the 
equations pooling the company data. Regardless of whether allowance is 
made for company-specific effects, the coefficient of Q is highly signifi- 
cant. If  different firms have the same adjustment cost functions, then 
both the intercept and slope will be equal across firms. Because we do  not 
do the GLS transformation, we cannot do an F test of this hypothesis. 
Instead, we do  a x2  test, which overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothe- 
ses that both parameters are equal across firms. We also test for the 
equality of  just the slopes and just the intercepts. In both cases, we reject 
the null hypothesis.’ 
7. To do a xz test, we run the following regression: 
=ao + alQ  + a,FRMDUMl+  . . . 
+ a,,FRMDUM29  + a31  FRMDUMl x Q 
+ ...+  a,,FRMDUM29  x Q, 
I 
RNPPE + RLINV 
where FRMDUMl to FRMDUM29 are firm dummies. Let V be the estimated covariance 258  Michael A. Salinger/Lawrence H. Summers 
Table 8.2  Investment Equations Using Tax-adjusted Q 
Company  Intercept  Slope 
Allied Chemical 
Aluminum Company of  America 
American Brands 
American Can 
American Telephone & Telegraph 
Bethlehem Steel 













Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
Owens-Illinois 
Proctor & Gamble 
Sears 










































































































R2=  .55 
DW=2.01 
R2=  .56 
DW = 1.77 
R2=  .26 
DW=.64 
R2=  .53 
D W =  1.60 
R2=.12 
DW=1.09 




R2=  .26 
D W = 1.03 
R2=  .64 
D W = 1.02 
R2=  .15 
DW=1.74 
R2=  .74 
DW =  1.57 
R2=  .13 
DW=.93 
R2=  .ll 
DW=.45 
R2=  .05 
DW=1.00 
R2=  .02 
DW=1.27 
R2  = .06 
DW =  1.36 
R2=  .03 
DW=1.29 
R2=  .18 
DW=1.42 
R2= .29 
DW = 1.22 
R2=  .01 
DW = .95 
R2=  .79 
DW=1.91 
R2=  .53 
DW=1.73 
R2=  .37 
DW= 1.35 259  Tax Reform  and Corporate Investment 
Table 8.2 (cont.) 
Company  Intercept  Slope 
United States Steel  .090 
(5.28) 
Union Carbide  ,169 
United Technologies  .114 
(2.25) 
Westinghouse  .113 
(4.30) 
Woolworth  ,181 
(7.31) 
All companies with common intercept  .166 
(21.09) 
All companies with different intercepts  . . . 
(7.37) 
.010  R2=  .04 
(35)  DW=.69 
,009  R2=  .10 
(.51)  DW=1.10 
.068  R2=  .56 
(3.18)  DW=1.15 
,022  R2=  .57 
(3.24)  DW =  1.05 
.013  R2=  .25 
(1.41)  DW=.68 
,004  R2=  28 
.006  R2=.54 
(4.77) 
(4.32) 
The theory of  investment developed in the preceding section implies 
that lagged values of q should not have any effect on current investment. 
It takes no account of  delivery lags or lags in implementing investment 
plans. This is a potentially serious difficulty. The equations in table 8.2 
were therefore reestimated including lagged values. While this improved 
their explanatory power a little bit, lagged Q was rarely significant, so 
these results are not reported here. 
In table 8.3, the relative explanatory power of Q and q is contrasted. If 
equation (18) were the true investment function, then the coefficient on 
Q would be positive and significant and the coefficient on q would be 
insignificant. With only three exceptions, the coefficient of Q is positive; 
in over half the regressions, it is significant. Nearly all of the coefficients 
of  q are negative, and nearly half are significant. This is not surprising. 
Because capital is not homogeneous and the stock market is extremely 
volatile, one would expect the stock market component of q to be a very 
noisy  signal of  the marginal  return  on incremental  investment.  The 
tax-adjustment parts of  the Q series are much less subject to error. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that their effect would be greater than that 
of  the stock market. This is reflected in the negative coefficients on q. 
This point underscores the importance of  making tax adjustments in 
studying the relation between investment and q.R 
matrix of the regression. Let V be the lower right-hand 58 x 58 submatrix of  V. Let a be the 
column vector composed of  u2 to a5y.  Under the null hypothesis that the adjustment cost 
functions are identical, u'(V)-  '&,&. The test statistic is 357.8. The statistics for the tests 
that just the intercepts and just the slopes are equal are, respectively, 95.5 and 120.8. Notice 
that our estimate of  the covariance matrix asymptotically approaches the true covariance 
matrix only as  f+=.  Even though the pooled regression has 450 data points, Tis still 15, so 
the asymptotic distribution of  the test is unlikely to hold. 
8. If  we had a larger sample, we could handle the errors in variables with an instrumental 
variables procedure. The tax rates are appropriate instruments because they are measured 260  Michael A. Salinger/Lawrence H. Summers 
Table 8.3  Investment Equations Using Q and q 
Company  Intercept  Q  9 
Allied Chemical 
Aluminum Company of  America 
American Brands 
American Can 
American Telephone & Telegraph 
Bethlehem Steel 













Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
Owens-Illinois 
Proctor & Gamble 
Sears 




































































































-  ,413 
(- 1.57) 








-  ,707 
(-2.27) 












R2=  .67 
D W =  2.04 
R2=  .35 
DW=.98 
-.096  RZ=.85 
-4.25)  DWz1.63 
-.258  R2=.39 
-2.53)  DW=1.50 
-.185  RZ=.26 
(-.84)  DW=1.04 
-.lo0  R2=.74 
-2.27)  DW=1.71 
-.339  R2=.44 
( -  2.44) 
-  ,050 
(- .27) 
-  ,340 
(-3.98) 
-  ,263 
(- 4.30) 
-  ,493 
(- 1.74) 




-  .082 
(-2.91) 
-  .087 
(- 1.64) 
-  .601 
(-2.64) 




-  ,221 
-  '178 
(- 2.00) 
DW = 1.76 
R2=  .74 
DW= 1.57 
R2=  .13 
DW=.93 
R2=  .70 
DW=.95 
R2=  .29 
DW=1.40 
R2=  .49 
DW=1.19 
RZ=  .06 
DW=1.36 
RZ=  .44 
DW = 1.74 
R2=  .34 
DW=1.60 
RZ=  .55 
DW= 1.47 




R2=  .64 
DW =  2.07 
RZ=  .47 
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Table 8.3 (cont.) 
Company  Intercept  Q  4 
United States Steel  .196  ,070  -.170  R2=.04 
(3.91)  (2.52)  (-2.38)  DW=.75 
(1.36)  (.83)  (-.73)  DWzl.87 
(1.90)  (2.37)  (-1.10)  DW=1.34 
(1.96)  (.89)  (-.17)  DW=1.08 
(3.45)  (1.36)  (-1.05)  DW=.99 
Union Carbide  ,419  ,142  -.428  RZ=.38 
United Technologies  ,239  ,122  -.195  R2=.60 
Westinghouse  ,122  ,028  -.017  R2=.57 
Woolworth  ,254  .052  -.132  R’z.32 
All companies with common intercept  .226  ,031  -0.90  R2=.33 
All companies with different intercepts  . . .  ,033  -.099  R2=.59 
(12.08)  (4.16)  (-3.48) 
(5.15)  (-4.38) 
The results obtained in this section provide quite strong microecon- 
ometric support  for the q  theory of  investment.  The results parallel 
closely those obtained in Summers’ (19814 study of  aggregate invest- 
ment over the entire 1929-78  period. The aggregate results suggest a 
somewhat larger responsiveness of  investment to q than is found here. 
This is probably because aggregation reduces some of the noise in indi- 
vidual firms’ q.  Future progress in reconciling micro- and macroestimates 
of  the effects of  q, and in improving the explanatory power of  these 
equations, must await the development of methods for taking account of 
rents and the nonhomogeneity of  the capital stock. 
8.3  Tax Reform and Corporate Valuation 
This section assesses the impact of alternative tax reforms on corporate 
profitability  and  on share valuation. The equations estimated in  the 
previous section provide the basis for estimating the impact of a given tax 
reform on a firm’s investment. In order to estimate the effect of  a given 
tax reform on a firm’s investment, one must first calculate its effect on Q. 
The principal difficulty in this calculation comes in estimating the effect of 
the reform on V,  the  market value of firm equity. The procedure followed 
here is to estimate the impact on the market value of equity by calculating 
the present value of the change in tax liabilities which a reform will cause 
assuming that the firm’s growth is not affected by the tax change. 
A proper  calculation  of  this type would  require the simultaneous 
estimation of the entire growth path of  the firm. This path is of  course 
precisely compared with the value and replacement cost of  the firm and because they are 
determined exogenously. In small samples, however, instrumental variable regressions are 
badly biased. 262  Michael A. Salingerl Lawrence H. Summers 
affected by tax reforms. Deriving the path of investment following a tax 
change requires the solution of  a two-point boundary value problem as 
described in Summers (1981a). Because the response of  investment to 
change in Q is estimated to be small, the approximation error involved is 
likely to be very small. 
The first step in estimating the change in market value from a tax 
change is estimating  its effect on after-tax  profits.  In  this paper, we 
consider three alternative tax reforms: indexation of  the tax system to 
adjust for inflation, 25% acceleration of  depreciation deductions, and 
reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate from 46 to 40%.’ It is easiest 
to begin by describing how the change in profits arising from the corpo- 
rate rate reduction was calculated. 
In general, reported profits differ from taxable profits. As a result, to 
estimate the effect of a change in the corporate tax rate, we look at actual 
taxes paid. With a tax rate of  46%, taxes are given by 
T = 0.461~~  -  ITC -  FTC, 
where T = taxes,  IT^ = taxable profits, ITC = investment tax credit, and 
FTC  =  foreign  tax  credit.  Reducing  the corporate  tax  rate to 0.40 
increases profits by 0.6~~.  We assume that all foreign taxes paid can be 
claimed as a credit.’O Thus we estimate the change in profits by 
6 
46 
An (tax reduction) = -  (T  + ITC + FTC) .  (19) 
The change in profits from accelerating depreciation and using replace- 
ment cost depreciation are, respectively, 
AIT (depreciation acceleration) 
-  -  (:‘  E)NPLT  x 0.46, 
AIT (replacement cost depreciation) 
L 
=  -(NPL~ -  NPL~)  x 0.46. 
L 
In indexing debt, we allow firms to deduct only real interest payments on 
the market value of the debt. Using an ARMA procedure based only on 
prior  data, we  estimate  that at  the  beginning of  1978 the expected 
inflation rate over a long horizon was 0.053. We thus deduct from profits: 
9.  Specifically, we assume that the useful life for tax purposes is reduced by 25%. The 
reduction results in a 33%% increase in 6,  the depreciation rate. 
10. Firms may claim foreign taxes up  to the United States  statutory tax rate times foreign 
pretax profits as a tax credit. The maximum applies to all foreign taxes paid. Thus a firm can 
offset taxes above the United States corporate tax rate by operating in another country with 
a tax rate lower than the United States’. 263  Tax Reform  and Corporate Investment 
(20)  A.rr(debt indexation) = 0.053 x MVDEBT X 0.46. 
In general, the inventory adjustment is 
(21)  An(inventory indexation) = 0.46 X FRFIFO 
CPI  x INV-1 x -. 
CPI -  1 
When inventories are drawn down, however, an adjustment also has to 
be made for liquidated LIFO inventories. As in the estimation of  real 
inventories, we assume that the reduction in LIFO inventories comes 
from goods purchased in the previous year. 
To estimate the change in market value, we need to project future 
values for each firm's taxes, net plant, debt, and inventories. We assume 
that the real value of  these quantities grows at the same rate. We esti- 
mated the growth rate of  real net property, plant, and equipment from 
1964 to 1978. Over that period, some of  the firms had growth rates 
exceeding 10% per year. In general, such growth rates reflect the adjust- 
ment to a new equilibrium and we do not expect them to continue. Thus 
we average the historic growth rate with 3% to get expected future 
growth. 
In the calculations below, it is assumed that investors expect that the 
rate of  inflation will remain permanently at 0.053.  It is assumed that 
potential tax reforms are permanent and unanticipated. When consider- 
ing, for example, the acceleration of depreciation, we assume that people 
did not foresee the tax law change. When the change occurs, people 
expect it to last forever. We assume that a real discount rate of  10% can 
be  applied to all cash flows. This may  be  misleading, since the risk 
characteristics of  depreciation allowances differ greatly from those of 
pretax profits. 
The formula for the change in  V from corporate tax rate reduction, 
inventory indexation, and debt indexation is 
AT  1-OD  AV=-- 
0.1-g  1-c' 
where g is the growth rate. To reduce the effect of wide annual fluctua- 
tions, we use three year averages of inventories and taxes paid rather than 
the 1978 values. The averages are calculated in real terms and adjusted 
for growth. 
The change in Vfrom a change in the depreciation tax law is the sum of 
the changes in the value of  depreciation deductions on existing capital 
and on future additions to capital. The former is simply the change in B. 
New investment at time t is given by 
NI(t) =  g + -  RNPPE(0)eg',  (  2) 264  Michael A. SalingerILawrence H. Summers 
where  RNPPE represents  the real value of  net  property,  plant,  and 
equipment. The change in the value of the depreciation deduction at time 
t of investment at time t is the change in Z.  Thus the change in the value of 
depreciation deductions on all future new investment is the change in Z 
times the discounted stream of  investment. 
While most recent discussions of  corporate tax reforms have focused 
on the likely impact on investment, issues of equity should be considered 
as well. Unsophisticated observers focus on the distinction between tax 
relief for business and for  individuals. This is misleading, as corporations 
should  be  thought of as conduits. All taxes are ultimately borne by 
individuals in their role as labor suppliers, consumers, or suppliers of 
capital. The change in the value of the stock market following a tax 
change is a direct measure of  the present value of  the burdens it will 
impose on the suppliers of  equity capital. It thus seems a natural candi- 
date for measuring the incidence of capital tax reforms. 
In addition to examining the impact of  tax policy on the functional 
distribution of income, it is instructive to model the effects of tax reforms 
on the stock market for two other reasons. First, it is widely accepted that 
a good tax reform should minimize windfall gains and losses. The size of 
the policy-induced jump in the stock market is a good measure of its 
windfall effect. If, as available evidence suggests, investors fail to hold 
diversified portfolios, then differential effects of tax reforms on different 
securities create windfall gains and losses. 
Second, the effect of  tax policy on the stock market is of  concern to 
those sensitive to issues of vertical equity. Virtually all corporate equity is 
owned directly or indirectly by  the very wealthy. About 75% is held 
directly by  individuals. Of  this, available evidence indicates that about 
50% is held by families with incomes in the top 1% of  the population. 
This actually understates the true concentration because much of  the 
remainder of the stock is held by  individuals with deceptively low re- 
ported incomes due to successful sheltering or life-cycle effects. The 
remaining stock is mostly held by pension funds, foreigners, and insur- 
ance companies. Since almost all pension plans offer defined benefits, the 
pension’s assets are ultimately owned not by the beneficiaries but by the 
shareowners in the corporations with pension liabilities. Hence this stock 
also should be assigned primarily to rich households. The distributional 
consequences of insurance company and foreign ownership are less clear. 
But the conclusion that any tax-induced change in profitability which 
shows up  in  the stock  market  redounds  almost entirely  to the very 
wealthy seems inevitable. Therefore the analysis below focuses on the 
effects of  tax reforms on both investment and the stock market. Recent 
research suggests the importance of dividend clienteles. This implies that 
changes in the relative valuation of different firms may have large effects 
on the distribution of  wealth. 265  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
In table 8.4 the effects of  indexing the tax system are considered. The 
relative effects of the different components of  indexing vary among firms. 
Indexing debt has a small impact on Kodak, which is almost entirely 
equity financed, and a large impact on AT&T, which is largely debt 
financed. Inventory indexation has no effect on  firms already using LIFO 
but a large effect on American Brands, which primarily uses FIFO. With 
only two exceptions, the effect of  total indexation is to increase firm 
value, thus suggesting that the interaction of  inflation and corporate taxes 
has at least partially contributed to the decline in the real value of  the 
stock market. In some cases, indexation has a significantly larger impact 
on profits than on firm value. This phenomenon is undoubtedly a result of 
some firms having unusually low real profits in 1978. In making these 
calculations, we implicitly assume that a reduction in taxable profits is of 
value to  the firm. The effect of total indexation on firm value ranges from 
-  13.3% for Sears to 20.4% for American Brands. Typically, indexation 
leads to an increase in firm value of  between 5% and 10%. 
This contradicts the results of  several earlier studies (e.g. Shoven and 
Bulow  1975)  which  suggested that indexing  would  be approximately 
neutral or  actually increase corporate income tax liabilities. The  reason is 
that our calculation focuses on the long-run impact of increases in infla- 
tion rather than their immediate impact on the current income, which 
includes revaluations of  outstanding long-term debt. 
These calculations of the impact of indexation on stock market valua- 
tions implicitly assume that the market is rational with respect to infla- 
tion. This hypothesis is examined explicitly in Summers (1981c), who 
finds some evidence  that at least historically the market has failed to  fully 
recognize the effects of  inflation-taxation  interactions. 
Table 8.5  considers the effect of  reducing the corporate tax rate from 
0.46 to 0.4 and of  accelerating depreciation by 25%. On average, the 
latter reform increases firm value by 7%.  Not surprisingly, the effect on 
capital-intensive firms is larger. The effect of a reduction in the tax rate 
ranges from 4.1% for Bethlehem Steel to 34.7% for Exxon. If  taxable 
income equals real income, the tax rate reduction should increase firm 
value by  11%. Because the interaction of  inflation and the tax system 
cause taxable profits to be higher than real profits, the tax rate reduction 
should increase  firm  value  by  more than  11%. In fact,  the average 
increase in firm value from indexing in table 8.4  is consistent with the 13% 
average increase in firm value from a tax rate reduction. The variation 
among firms of  the effect of  indexing does not, however, explain the 
variation of the effect of the tax rate reduction. The 34.7% increase in 
Exxon’s value, for example, cannot be explained by the inflation-induced 
overstatement of profits. In 1978, Exxon’s foreign and federal taxes were 
65% of its taxable income. A large portion of  Exxon’s taxes were foreign. 
Saudi Arabia levies a large “tax” on oil extraction. It is not clear that this Table 8.4  Effect of  Indexation on Profitability and Stock Market Valuation 
Company 
~  ~~ 
% Change in V  % Change in Profits 
Inven-  Depreci-  hen-  Depreci- 
tones  ation  Debt  Total  tories  ation  Debt  Total 
Allied Chemical 
Aluminum Company of  America 
American Brands 
American Can 
American Telephone & Telegraph 
Bethlehem Steel 







2.9  14.3 
4.0  11.3 
41.2  5.9 
10.7  10.3 
.5  18.4 
7.7  32.0 
2.9  8.7 
2.4  5.3 
.o  10.3 
3.0  4.3 
13.3  5.2 
5.1  9.7 
14.6  18.9 
-  13.6 











-  26.2 
3.6  .1  98.7 
1.5  4.5  16.1 
20.4  39.5  5.5 
11.9  31.6  37.2 
-  2.9  1.3  47.5 
15.7  .4  84.9 
5.5  3.3  10.3 
7.1  2.2  5.0 
4.8  .1  19.2 
3.0  4.4  6.5 
13.3  22.6  11.0 
12.3  3.4  6.0 
7.3  29.8  38.7 
-78.0 
-  12.4 
-  19.6 
-20.2 
-44.5 
-  33.5 
-5.4 


















27.6 International Nickel"  25.7  18.0  -28.7  15.0 
International Business Machines  .8  3.8  -  .2  4.4  2.1  9.1  -  .6  10.6 
International Harvester  16.7  8.4  -  22.6  2.5  37.2  20.4  -38.1  19.5 
Johns-Manville  .o  10.9  -9.2  1.7  .o  9.6  -  6.5  3.2 
Merck  8.9  6.6  -5.6  9.9  6.8  3.9  -3.5  7.2 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing  7.5  5.2  -  3.5  9.2  7.2  4.7  -2.8  9.2 
Owens-Illinois  7.0  17.3  -  19.5  4.8  12.1  32.2  -26.4  17.9 
Proctor & Gamble  2.2  3.7  -  3.2  2.7  3.8  6.0  -4.2  5.6 
Sears  .o  2.8  -  16.1  -  13.3  .4  4.5  -  17.2  -  12.2 
Standard Oil of California  2.0  9.4  -5.1  6.3  .8  13.6  -4.8  9.6 
Texaco  4.0  13.0  -  9.3  7.7  2.2  25.3  -  12.3  15.2 
United States Steel"  .o  17.8  -  16.3  1.5 
Union Carbide  6.1  15.8  -  15.7  6.2  .2  32.3  -  27.0  5.5 
United Technologies  12.6  3.7  -3.8  12.5  17.7  6.0  -  4.7  19.0 
Westinghouse  9.9  11.0  -  7.0  13.9  9.9  12.9  -5.5  17.3 
Woolworth  20.7  11.7  -  17.1  15.3  21.0  13.2  -  13.7  20.5 
*  *  *  * 
International Paper  21.8  10.6  -  12.2  20.2  3.3  16.8  -  14.3  5.7 
*  *  *  t 
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Table 8.5  Effect of Tax Changes on Profitability 
and Stock Market Valuation 
% Change in V  % Change in Profits 
Depreci-  Depreci- 
Tax Rate  ation  Tax Rate  ation 
Reduc-  Acceler-  Reduc-  Acceler- 
Company  tion  ation  tion  ation 
Allied Chemical 
Aluminum Company of  America 
American Brands 
American Can 
American Telephone & Telegraph 
Bethlehem Steel 







International  Nickel” 
International  Business Machines 
International  Harvester 
International  Paper 
Johns-Manville 
Merck 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
Owens-Illinois 
Proctor & Gamble 
Sears 
Standard Oil of  California 
Texaco 





























































































































”Negative profits in 1978. 
tax is an income tax, so it may not qualify for the foreign tax credit. Even 
if it does, the tax may be large enough to make Exxon’s tax rate  on foreign 
profits well above 0.46. In either case, our assumption that all foreign 
taxes can be claimed as a credit is likely to be violated. 
8.4  Tax Reforms, Q, and Investment 
In this section we derive estimates of  the impact of  the tax reform 
packages considered above on firm investment. The estimates are calcu- 269  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
lated  first by  using the estimates of  the impact  of  tax changes  on V 
displayed in tables 8.4 and 8.5 to find the estimated change in Q, and then 
by multiplying this figure by the coefficient on Q in the firm investment 
equation. 
It should be stressed at the outset that these estimates are subject to 
very substantial error. Beyond the difficulties of  inaccuracy in the data, a 
major limitation of  the analysis is that for some firms the effect of changes 
in Q is estimated only with a large standard error. Moreover, the effect of 
tax reforms on V is estimable only approximately due to the somewhat 
arbitrary assumptions made about the choice of  a discount and growth 
rate, and the neglect of  the economy-wide feedback effects of  increased 
capital  accumulation.  While  these conclusions are, to say the least, 
tentative, they illustrate the potential of  this methodology for a much 
richer analysis of  the effects of  tax changes. 
An additional issue is posed by FIFO inventory accounting. As table 
8.4 demonstrates, a substantial fraction of  the gains to corporations from 
indexing arise from the elimination of  the taxation of FIFO  profits. There 
exist some reasons to believe that any extra taxes incurred as a result of 
FIFO inventory accounting do not discourage investment in plant and 
equipment. It is argued that the taxes are voluntary and so are unlikely to 
be paid  if  they impose a  burden. In  addition  it  is argued that taxes 
on inventory holdings  should have no impact on the return to plant 
and equipment investment and so should not affect these investment 
decisions. 
Table 8.6 presents the effects of indexation on Q and on investment. 
While  there  is  considerable  variation  among  firms,  total  indexation 
generally  increases  investment  by  less than 5%.  Table 8.7 gives the 
projections  of  how  lowering  the corporate tax  rate and accelerating 
depreciation affect Q and investment. Again, the increase in investment 
by most of  the firms is between 0% and 5%. Comparing these results with 
tables 8.4 and 8.5, it is clear that the tax changes have a larger impact on 
firm valuation than on investment. 
Comparing tables 8.6 and 8.7 with tables 8.4  and 8.5, it can be seen that 
in the short run the costs of these changes are large compared with their 
benefits.  In many cases, the amendments would have a much greater 
impact  on firm  value  than on investment.  For  example,  completely 
indexing the tax  system would  increase  International  Paper’s  market 
value by 20.2%. At the same time, International Paper would increment 
its investments by only 0.6%. Similarly, a 15% growth in the value of 
International  Nickel would stimulate additional investment of only 1.5%. 
While these firms are  outliers, market value would increase twice as much 
as investment for most firms. 
The large change in firm value would also have an undesirable impact 
on the distribution of  wealth. These changes in the corporate income tax Table 8.6  Effect of Indexation on Q and Investment 
Company 
Change in Q  % Change in Investment 
Inven-  Depreci-  Inven-  Depreci- 
tories  ation  Debt  Total  tones  ation  Debt  Total 
Allied Chemical 
Aluminum Company of  America 
American Brands 
American Can 
American Telephone & Telegraph 
Bethlehem Steel 

































-  ,176 
-.184 
-  .540 
-  .110 
-  .309 
-.116 
-  .158 
-  .030 
-  ,110 
-  ,188 
-  .136 
-  .057 















.4  2.9 
.9  3.9 
26.2  13.9 
5.2  8.6 
.o  1.5 
2.9  17.0 
.1  .6 
.6  2.2 
.a  2.2 
3.0  2.4 
.3  1.2 
3.6  9.2 
*  * 
-2.0  1.3 
-  3.0  1.8 
-  16.7  23.4 
-  4.4  9.4 
-  1.5  .o 
-9.0  10.9 
-  .3  0.4 
-  .1  2.7 
-1.1  1.9 
-  1.2  4.2 
-  .2  1.3 
-6.4  6.4 
*  * International Nickel 





Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
Owens-Illinois 
Proctor & Gamble 
Sears 
Standard Oil of  California 
Texaco 







































-  ,297 
-  .027 
-  ,183 
-  ,239 
-  ,179 
-  ,537 
-  ,240 
-  ,210 
-  .184 
-  .651 
-  ,098 
-  .133 
-  ,105 
-  ,179 
-  ,120 
-  ,096 


















1.6  1.7 
.1  .8 
1.4  2.5 
.3  2.1 
.4  .5 
1.1  1.2 
1.7  6.6 
.1  .4 
.o  5.5 
.6  3.9 
.4  1.8 
.o  1.9 
.4  1.5 
10.7  7.8 
2.7  6.3 
1.3  2.4 
*  * 
-  1.8 
-  .O 
-  1.8 
-  1.8 
-  .3 
-  .5 
-4.8 
-  .2 
-11.0 
-  1.5 
-  .9 
-  1.2 
-  1.0 
-3.2 
-  1.9 
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Table 8.7  Effect of Tax Reforms on Q and Investment 
Company 
% Change in 
Change in Q  Investment 
Depreci-  Depreci- 
Tax Rate  ation  Tax  Rate  ation 
Reduc-  Acceler-  Reduc-  Acceler- 
tion  ation  tion  ation 
Allied Chemical 
Aluminum Company of  America 
American Brands 
American Can 
American Telephone & Telegraph 
Bethlehem Steel 







International  Nickel 





Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
Owens-Illinois 
Proctor & Gamble 
Sears 
Standard Oil of  California 
Texaco 
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"Change in  investment  not  projected when  estimated  coefficient of  tax-adjusted  Q  is 
negative. 
are being considered along with reductions in personal income taxes for 
people in top income brackets. Combined, these policies may cause a 
large shift of  wealth to those who are already wealthy. 
If  the government's  objective  is  to increase  investment,  it  should 
implement  the reforms which most directly affect the relative cost of 
capital. Indexing or accelerating depreciation induces more investment 
for a given increase in market value than do the other changes. Consider, 
for example, the effects of  indexing inventories  and depreciation for 273  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
American Can. The two changes have a nearly equal effect on firm 
valuation, but depreciation  indexing has almost twice the effect on  invest- 
ment that inventory  indexing does.  Similarly, the tax rate reduction 
would increase the value of  Goodyear by 20.4% while the depreciation 
acceleration would increase it by only 12.3%. The latter change would, 
however, increase Goodyear’s investment more than the former. 
Investment studies that use aggregate data  miss the effect of policies on 
the composition of  investment. Yet, the results in this study suggest that 
the impact of  tax changes would vary significantly across firms.  Since 
these results are for a small number of  firms, it is difficult to  say whether 
most of  the variation is across or  within industries. Insofar as adjustment 
costs are part of  an  industry’s technology, one  might expect similar results 
for firms in the same industry. On  the other hand, the analysis in section 
8.1 assumed a competitive market structure. Especially for the Dow 30, 
this assumption is tenuous. It is possible that the response to a tax change 
could depend on a firm’s competitive position within an industry. The 
three chemical firms in  the sample show similar responses to all the 
changes. In contrast, though, Bethlehem Steel’s investment is much more 
sensitive to tax changes than United States Steel’s. An important exten- 
sion of this paper would be to explore more systematically the effect of 
taxes on the composition of  investment. 
8.5  Conclusions 
This preliminary  attempt to examine the impact of  alternative  tax 
reforms on the investment decisions of  individual firms has yielded prom- 
ising results. The q theory approach has substantial predictive power at 
the microlevel. The  econometric  results suggest that explanatory power is 
enhanced even further when tax effects are recognized. The simulation 
results confirm  that tax policies can have large effects on both stock 
market valuations and investment incentives in both the short and the 
long run. They also indicate that the effects of investment incentives are 
likely to differ very substantially across firms. 
The differences arise from variations both in  the magnitude of  tax 
effects on firms’ incentives to invest and in the responsiveness of  firms’ 
investment  to changes in  investment  incentives.  The latter are due, 
according to the model, to differing adjustment cost functions. 
While these results are informative and encouraging, a great deal needs 
to be done before it will be possible to make accurate predictions of  the 
impact of  tax reforms on individual corporate or even industry invest- 
ment decisions. The most important area for further investigation is the 
relaxation of  the stringent assumptions about the homogeneity of capital 
and absence of  rents that were made here. This will probably necessitate 
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work along these lines promises us a greater understanding not just of tax 
effects on investment but also of tax effects on the other components of  a 
firm's net worth such as intangibles. 
Appendix 
The source of the data is the Compustat tapes and spans the years 1959 to 
1978. To estimate tax-adjusted Q, we need estimates of the market value 
of equity, the market value of debt, the replacement value of inventories, 
the replacement value of the capital stock, and the taxable capital stock. 
Throughout the analysis, we tried to get these figures for the beginning of 
each year. 
Market Value of  Equity 
Compustat gives the closing price of a share of stock for each company. 
The value of common stock at the beginning of  the year is estimated as 
the closing value in year t -  1  times the number of shares outstanding at 
r -  1. The value of  preferred stock is estimated by  dividing preferred 
dividends by the Standard and Poor's preferred stock yield. 
Market Value of  Debt 
Compustat lists the book value of both long-term and short-term debt. 
We assume that the market value of  short-term debt equals the book 
value. In principle, to estimate the market value of  long-term debt, we 
need to know the years to maturity, coupon rate, and default characteris- 
tics of all debt issues. Compustat does not have this information. Follow- 
ing Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss (1980), we assume: (1) All new issues of 
long-term debt have a maturity of twenty years. (2) The coupon rate is the 
BAA rate prevailing in the year of issue, and the default characteristics of 
the bonds continue to warrant a BAA rating until they reach maturity. (3) 
In 1959, the maturity distribution of bonds for each firm was proportional 
to the maturity distribution of  aggregate outstanding issues." (4)  New 
issues of  long-term debt for the years 1960 to 1978 are given by 
N, = LTD, -  LTD, -  1 + NT-  20. ,  -  1 
if LTD, -  LTD,-  + NT-20,r  20, 
if  LTD, -  LTDrPI  + NT-zo,,<O, 
where LTD, = new issues of long-term debt in year t,  NT,, = debt issued 
at time i still outstanding at time t,  and LTD, = long-term debt in year t. 
We add N~-20.r-1  because, each period, the debt issued twenty years 
N,=O 
11. The data on aggregate outstanding issues come from Hisforical Sfatistics of the 
United Stares, series X  499-509,  p. 1005. 275  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
earlier is retired. (5)  If  LTD, -  LTD,-  + N:-zo, ,  - <  0, the issues from 
each previous year are reduced proportionately. That is, 
Each  year  the market  value  of  debt issued in  year  i (MVNT,,) is 
calculated using the familiar formula for the value of  a coupon bond: 
MVNT,,= NT,,  [BAAi  -  [1 -  (  1  ji’”-‘] 
BAA,  1  + BAA, 
1 
+
 (1  + BAA,)i+*o-r]  ’ 
The value of  all long-term debt outstanding in year t(MVLTD,) is, then, 
f 
i=r-19 
MVLTD,=  2  MVNT,,. 
The Replacement Value of  Inventories 
To estimate the replacement value of  inventories, one needs to know 
the method  of  inventory valuation.  For  companies using FIFO, the 
reported level of inventories equals the market value of inventories. For 
companies using LIFO, the reported  level of  inventories bears little 
relation to the market value. Compustat does give the inventory valua- 
tion method. In addition to LIFO and FIFO, it allows for specific iden- 
tification, average cost, retail method, standard cost, and replacement 
cost inventory valuation. We assume that all methods except for LIFO 
are identical to FIFO. When companies report more than one method of 
inventory accounting, Compustat lists them in descending order of  im- 
portance but gives no estimate of  the relative weights. We assume that 
the first method reported accounts for Y3  of the real value of inventories 
and the second method accounts for the remaining Y3. We make this 
assumption even when more than two methods are reported. Finally, we 
assume that the methods reported in 1978 were also used from 1959 to 
1977. 
We assume that reported LIFO inventories equal the market value of 
LIFO inventories in 1959. This assumption is plausible because there was 
a sustained period of price stability before 1959. For a company that uses 
only LIFO, reported inventories will stay constant if  the real value of 
inventories does not change. To get the new replacement cost of  inven- 
tories under such circumstances, we multiply the old replacement cost by 
the inflation rate. Throughout this paper, increases in the consumer price 
index are used for the inflation rate. Reported inventories increase or 
decline  as the  real  level of  inventories  increases  or declines. When 
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When reported inventories fall, the price level at which liquidations are 
valued is not clear since we do not know when they were purchased. We 
assume that they were purchased the previous year. Thus, letting INV, be 
reported inventories  at time t and RLINV, be real inventories at time t,  we 
calculate real inventories as follows: 
CPI, 
CP1,-  1 
RLINV, = RLINV, -  1  ~ 
+ INV, -  INV,-  if INV, 2 INV,- 1, 
RLINV, = (RLINV,-  + INV, 
-  INVf-l)-  “I,  if  INV, <  INV, - . 
CPI, -  1 
When more than one inventory valuation method is used, we need to 
decompose inventories into a LIFO and a FIFO component. The calcula- 
tion is complicated because inflation changes the fraction of  reported 
LIFO and FIFO inventories. For example, consider a firm that in year t 
has 100 units of  LIFO inventories and 100 units of  FIFO inventories. 
Assume that both the LIFO and FIFO inventories are valued at $1 per 
unit. Thus the fraction of both real and reported inventories for which 
FIFO is used is %. In year t + 1, the company produces and sells 100 units 
of  both LIFO and FIFO goods. Suppose the price level doubles in year 
t + 1. The firm  reports $100 of  LIFO inventories and $200 of  FIFO 
inventories. While the fraction of  real inventories for which FIFO is used 
is still %,  reported FIFO inventories are now Y3  of total reported inven- 
tories. 
Let FRFIFO, be the fraction of  reported inventories for which FIFO is 
used in year t. When the real value of  inventories is unchanged, reported 
inventories increase by a factor of FRFIFO,-l ((CPI,/CPI,-  -  1). Let 
A = INV, -  INV,-  [  1  + FRFIFO  (------)I  CPI, 
CPI, -  1 
The term A is the change in reported inventories caused by a change in 
real inventories. Let ARLINV, be the change in real inventories, evalu- 
ated at prices in  time t. We can  decompose  A  into LIFO and FIFO 
components (ALIFO and AFIFO, respectively). Similarly, let ARFIFO 
and ARLIFO be the fractions of the change in real inventories for which 
FIFO and LIFO are used. 
In general, 
RLINV, =  ~  x RLINV,-  + ARLINV,, 
CPI, -  1 
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cpJf  x FRFIF0,-  x INV,-  + AFIFO 
INV, 
CPI, -  1 
FRFIFO, =  (A2) 
Equation (Al) says that real inventories in year c are real inventories in 
year t -  1,  evaluated at year c prices, plus the change in real inventories. 
The numerator on the right-hand side of  (A2) is the level of  reported 
FIFO inventories. Thus equation (A2) merely says that the fraction of 
reported inventories for which FIFO is used is reported FIFO inventories 
divided by total inventories. Not all of the variables in (Al) and (A2) are 
observable. In order to calculate RLINV, and FRFIFO,, we need to find 
expressions for ARLINV, and AFIFO, in terms of  observable variables. 
Consider the case in which 2/3  of  real inventories is FIFO and Y3  is 
LIFO. When the real valuation of  inventories rises (i.e. when A 2  0), the 
new LIFO inventories are evaluated at current prices. While it is logically 
possible that they are evaluated at past prices, our assumption is reason- 
able because inventory-to-sales ratios are much less than 1. Thus 
043) 
(A41 
Plugging (A3) and (A4) into (Al) and (A2) yields 
AFIFO, = ARFIFO, = 2/38,, 
ALIFO, = ARLIFO, = %A,. 
RLINV, = RLINV, -  1 ( -  "It  )+A, 
CPI, -  1 
INV,-  1 FRFIFO, -  1 (CPI,/CPI, -  1) + 2A/3.  FRFIFO, = 
INV, 
When A is negative, decreases in FIFO inventories must be valued at 
current prices. As before, decreases in LIFO inventories must be valued 
at the previous year's  prices. Thus 
(A51  AFIFO, = ARFIFO,, 
CPI, -  1 
CPI, 
ALIFO, = ARLIFO, -  , 
ARLIFO .  CPI, -  1  A = ARFIFO +  ~ 
CPI, 
Remembering that real LIFO inventories are half of  real FIFO invento- 
ries, equations (A5) and (A6) imply 
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Finally, putting  (A8) into (Al) and putting (A5) and (A7) into (A2) 
yields 
CPI, 
CPI, -  1 
RLINV, = RLINV,- 1 -  (A91 
CPI,  FRFIFO, -  1 X INVf- 1 X  ~ 
CPI, -  1 
+  A  ]/INV,. 
1 CPI,-1 
2  CPI, 
1+-- 
Equations (A9) and (A10) have only observable variables on the right- 
hand side. 
When real FIFO inventories are Y3  of  total real inventories, the equa- 
tions are as follows: 
CPI, 
CPI, -  1 
A = Z, -  I, - [  FRFIFO, - (~  -  1) + 11. 




RLINV, = RLINVf-  1 - 
FRFIFO,_I X INVt-l X CPI,/CPI,-i  + %A 
FRFIFO, = 
INV, 
If  A < 0, then 
“If  +A  3CP1, 
RLINV, = RLINV, -  1  ~ 
CPI, -  1  2CP1, -  1 + CPI, ’ 
FRFIFO,  1 ___  “If  INV,-I 
CP1,- 1 
+A  “If  ]/INV,. 
CPI, + 2CP1,- 1 
In the model in section 8.2,  production and sales occur simultaneously. 
As a result, the model does not allow for inventories. In estimating the 
model,  however,  inventories  must  be  considered  because  they  are 
reflected in the value of the firm. In the results reported here, inventories 
are  added  to  the  denominator  of  the  expression  (V -  B,)/p,K,. An 
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inventories are not completely liquid assets, one might choose to subtract 
only a fraction of  the real value of inventories from the numerator. We 
experimented with all three methods and got virtually identical results. 
Capital Stock 
In general, reported net property, plant, and equipment (NPPE) dif- 
fers not only from replacement cost but also from taxable net property, 
plant, and equipment (RNPPE and TNPPE, respectively). To estimate 
RNPPE and TNPPE, we construct an investment series and estimate 
depreciation rates.'*  In doing so, we assume: (1) All of a firm's capital has 
the same useful life (L). (2)  Firms use the straight-line method for book 
depre~iation.'~  (3) Both tax and actual depreciation are exponential with 
depreciation rate 2/L.  This method is identical to double declining bal- 
ance depre~iation.'~  (4) All investments are made at the beginning of the 
year, and all depreciation is taken at the end of the year. (5)  Investment 
for years 1959 -  L + 1  to 1978 is proportional to aggregate investment in 
these years and is consistent with gross property, plant, and equipment in 
1959. 
Under these assumptions, we can estimate the useful life in any year by 
GPPE,-I +  It 
DEP,  ' 
L;  = 
where GPPE, = book value of  gross property, plant, and equipment in 
year f, I, = investment in year t,  and DEP, = book depreciation in year 1. 
In practice, L* fluctuates from year to year, so the L we use is an average 
of  L*  from 1960 to 1978. 
Assuming that NPPE is 0 in year 1959 -  L,  we estimate TNPPE and 
RNPPE from 1959- L + 1  to 1978 as follows: 
TNPPE, = (TNPPE,-  1 + 1,)(1 -  2/L), 
RNPPE, -  1 - 
12. In general, there are serious problems with using property, plant, and equipment 
figures reported by companies. For example, one can go far awry by estimating gross plant 
in year r by adding gross plant in year t -  1 to investment in year t and subtracting estimated 
retirements. Even if  one goes to the annual report and gets actual retirements, the proce- 
dure is not foolproof.  Depreciation  method changes and mergers are the most common 
causes for the estimates to fail. 
13. The Compustat footnotes in principle gave the method of  depreciation, but we found 
it impossible to use information. First, Compustat says whether depreciation is straight-line, 
accelerated, or a  combination  of  both.  Many  companies  reported  a  combination  of 
methods.  Second, the depreciation  method often changes from year to year. Third, the 
footnote was often out of  position on the tape, so we could not use the footnote in a 
computer program. 
14. Companies that use double declining balance depreciation can switch to straight-line 
depreciation on  the remaining  balance  once  during  the life of  the asset.  As  a  result, 
exponential  depreciation  only approximates actual depreciation.  See Shoven and Bulow 
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The estimates of TNPPE, and RNPPE, for the years prior to 1959 use less 
than L -  1  years of  data. As a result, they are essentially meaningless. 
Starting with 1959, enough years of investment enter the calculations but 
the data come almost entirely  from  aggregate figures. For the years 
nearer the end of the sample, more firm-specific data are available so the 
estimates are more reliable. 
In estimating ps,  B,, and Z,, we assume that expected inflation and the 
required return on investments are constant. Specifically, we estimate 
p +  7~ by adding 0.06 to the BAA bond rate. The dividend and the capital 
gains tax rates vary among individuals. We use the effective tax rates 
estimated by Feldstein and Poterba (1980), who calculated a weighted 
average of  tax rates across taxpayers.  In each period, people expect 
existing tax rates to last forever. Given the assumption that p, 7~,  c,  OD, 
and T are constants, the integrals in equation @a),  (8b), and (8c) are easy 
to estimate: 
k=exp[--(s--t)],  Pt  l-c 
1-8 
p+?r  l-c 





z, =  T8 
P+'TF  8+- 
1  -c 
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Comment  Robert J. Shiller 
Salinger and Summers here present  and estimate a model of  firm be- 
havior that is used to evaluate the effects of  changes in tax laws on the 
value of  the firm and on the level of  investment. The estimation and 
simulation problems posed  by  the basic model are very  simple when 
compared to the problems  posed by  other models  currently used  to 
answer the same questions. There is, in fact, only one estimated coef- 
ficient whose value influences the results Salinger and Summers present. 
In contrast, the answers provided by  a conventional large-scale mac- 
roeconometric model might depend in varying degrees on hundreds of 
parameters  estimated  in  diverse  equations.  Moreover, conventional 
simulations  would  require  additional  information,  such  as  the form 
monetary policy takes after the tax law changes. The simplicity of  the 
Salinger-Summers model is due partly to their merely ignoring effects 
considered  by  other models.  It is  also  due, however,  to an elegant 
simplicity of  the model itself, which I find quite intriguing. 
The basic model presented here was presented in an earlier paper by 
Summers (1981)  and draws on earlier work by Abel(l982)  and Hayashi 
(1982).  Two critical assumptions are responsible for the estimated invest- 
ment function which appears here: the assumption of  stable adjustment 
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cost function of  a certain form and the assumption of  homogeneity of 
degree one in both production and demand. Their function does not 
depend on any assumption  of  a stable production function, demand 
function, factor supply function, or expectation function. It is entirely 
consistent with the investment function estimated that these functions 
may jump around erratically and even that the discount rate used by the 
market to capitalize dividends may be erratic. The claim that I have made 
elsewhere that stock prices are too “volatile” to be accounted for entirely 
in terms of  information about future dividends does not, strictly speak- 
ing, contradict this model. The investment function derived here is not 
immediately vulnerable to the rational expectationist criticism that pa- 
rameters of  estimated functions depend on the government policy rule. 
This criticism would be relevant only if  adjustment costs were for some 
reason a function of  the policy rule. It should be added, of course, that if 
these other functions cannot be modeled, then we will  be unable to 
answer most of the basic questions we are interested in regarding the tax 
policy. The simulations they do with the model in this paper do depend on 
such stability assumptions and are vulnerable to rational expectationist 
criticism. 
The reason why the investment function estimated here is so simple is 
that the model implies that the price of  the firm’s stock (relative to the 
capital stock) captures all the information relevant to the investment 
decision if  this price is transformed as described in the text to produce 
tax-adjusted  Q. Thus any shifts in  the production function, demand 
function, or factor supply functions as well as information about future 
shifts are reflected in the price of stock. Earlier investment functions also 
depended on the price of  the firm’s stock but for different reasons. For 
example, in the MIT-Penn  SSRC (MPS) model the cost of capital which 
enters the investment function depends on the dividend price ratio, but 
this ratio is taken to reflect the rate of  discount in  the market, not 
information  about future technology or demand, and is ultimately  a 
reflection of the monetary policy in force. Expectations of future demand 
are modeled by different variables. In practice, the same statistical cor- 
relation between investment and stock price may be reflected in the MPS 
investment function. 
The assumption of homogeneity of degree one is crucial for the Salin- 
ger-Summers  investment  function  because  investment  decisions  are 
made at the margin, i.e. with respect to a marginal Q.  The observed Q is 
in effect an average Q.  The assumption of constant returns to scale may 
not be altogether reasonable when one considers some of the individual 
firms studied here. If we take the model literally, it is assumed that, were 
it not for costs associated with acquisition of  new plant and equipment, 
General Motors (one of the firms for which the investment function had a 
poor fit) could at any point of time double its size and expect its value to 283  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
double. This is inconsistent with the notion that the price of  General 
Motors stock is a reflection of  rents accruing because of  its monopoly on 
some popular makes, rents which could rise or fall without engendering 
any investment opportunities.  The model would imply that Exxon (a firm 
for which the coefficient in the estimated investment function had the 
wrong sign) would contract its investments after the oil-crisis-induced fall 
in its share price in 1975. The fact that it increased its capital expenditures 
then (on new domestic production  and exploration facilities) suggests 
that average and marginal Q moved in opposite directions. 
While we may have no clear or hard evidence that many firms do  or do 
not face homogeneous constraints in production and demand and factor 
supply in  the sense required  by  this  model,  we  have more concrete 
knowledge about the kind of inhomogeneities imposed by the tax system. 
That the tax system destroys homogeneity is in itself no problem as long 
as the tax system does not make it impossible to infer marginal Q from 
average Q. Unfortunately,  there is a problem in inferring marginal Q and 
this problem reintroduces the  well-known problems of modeling expecta- 
tions into this otherwise simple framework. In order to infer marginal Q, 
Salinger and Summers make a number of  assumptions. Interest on debt is 
made equal to a constant b times the current nominal interest rate times 
the nominal value of  the current capital stock. They are assuming that 
debt is issued so that the real value of  debt is always b times the real 
capital stock. Thus new purchases of  debt (which must be subtracted 
from retained earnings in equation [  121 to arrive at dividends) is equal to 
Pb(Z -  IT  + sR).  If the firm were assumed to  follow another debt policy or 
were to finance with long-term debt, then the state of  the firm at time t 
would  not  be summarized  by  its capital  stock at  time  t. Additional 
information would be required about how much debt was outstanding 
and what interest rates it bore. They might better have handled interest 
deductibility on debt by assuming new debt was proportional to I,  say, 
was long-term, and distinguishing between interest deductions on past 
debt and new debt. They did something analogous to this in their separa- 
tion of  the depreciation deduction into two parts, B, and Z,. The term Z, 
depends on expected future variables, so that expectations must still be 
modeled. 
The other crucial assumption for the analysis is that costs of  adjustment 
are a stable function of  investment divided by  the capital stock. That 
adjustment costs depend only on  ZIK  causes the maximization problem to 
have only one shadow price, which is good since we observe only one 
price of  the firm. Formally, the model also assumes that the function is 
perfect, although of  course the estimated regression involves an error 
term. The natural interpretation for the error term is that it  reflects 
stochastic variations in the costs of  adjustment. It would be good if such 
variations were explicitly allowed for in the model, though I suspect the 284  Michael A. Salinger/Lawrence H. Summers 
resulting changes may not be fundamental. What is required for consist- 
ent ordinary least squares estimation of a model which can be used for 
judging the effects of tax policy or  investment, then, is that this error term 
be uncorrelated with  Q. If  Q varies primarily  because  of  exogenous 
changes in tax parameters,  this may be reasonable. In fact, the time series 
behavior of  Q depends primarily on behavior of the share price. This 
share price could be fluctuating because of changes in the cost of  adjust- 
ment. Consider a firm which produces a commodity whose price follows, 
say, a sine  wave through time. If its cost of  adjustment  should decline by a 
multiplicative factor for a while, the value of the firm and hence Q should 
rise.  If  this firm were in the sample on the rising portion of  its cost of 
adjustment curve, then this higher Q would coincide with higher invest- 
ment. This implies, then, an upward bias on the estimated coefficient 
which would tend to  cause an overstatement of the effects of  tax changes 
on investment. 
Other sources of fluctuations in the residual might include errors in 
measurement in Q or ZIK, or nonlinearities in the adjustment cost func- 
tion. Purely unsystematic errors in measuring ZIK  would cause no bias, 
while such errors in Q would cause a downward bias in the regression 
coefficient.  Some systematic errors in measurement might also be ex- 
pected. If their estimates of  K (which result from a simple cumulation of 
investment) were contaminated by  unsystematic  measurement  error, 
then both ZIK  and Q would be affected in the same direction by the error, 
which would tend to cause an upward bias in the regression coefficient. 
New “information” about future variables ought in itself to cause no 
residuals in this estimated investment function as it might in conventional 
investment functions  for  which  such  information  is  not  part  of  the 
hypothesized expectations mechanism. 
By estimating an adjustment cost function rather than a production 
function, demand function, or the like, Salinger and Summers bring us 
into unfamiliar territory. Knowing very little about such functions, one 
feels little reason to doubt that they are stable through time or that they 
have the form  indicated. We  should not allow ourselves to be complacent 
about these assumptions, however, just because we know little about 
them. 
One is tempted to imagine,  from the description in  the text, that 
adjustment costs are the costs of paying real estate agents to find new 
floor space, hiring planners to decide on the layout of new plants, and 
hiring workers to uncrate and install new machines. In practice, I think 
such costs are a trivial component of  the true costs of  adjustment modeled 
here. These costs represent the real barriers which prevent AT&T or 
IBM, say, from doubling their size. These firms would need to penetrate 
new markets in order to do  so. We might imagine that these firms have a 
monopoly, not in the markets for the individual products we associate 285  Tax Reform and Corporate Investment 
them with, but on a sort of  organizational structure which enables them to 
aggressively and creatively pursue new product lines and incur “adjust- 
ment costs” in doing so. These costs of adjustment are then quite intangi- 
ble. Should they be made a function of  ZIK? Why should they not be a 
function of  ZIL? It is easy to make this change in the model, which yields 
an investment function whose dependent variable is ZIL  rather than ZIK. 
Why should adjustment costs not be a function of HIL, where His  new 
hires? This would yield a very different model, in which q need not equal 
one  but in which firms would always hold an “optimal” capital stock and Z, 
would depend on the change in  a conventional cost of  capital figure. 
Alternatively, why should adjustment costs not depend on II(K-  inven- 
tories)? 
The  Salinger-Summers model does not distinguish between the price of 
capital goods and the price of aggregate output. It would certainly be in 
the spirit of  the model and a technical  improvement to assume that 
investment costs are reflected in a new capital goods price index PK. Then 
the model would relate Q to VI(PKK)  rather than Vl(PK).  Such a model 
would then make Q inversely related to the relative price of capital goods 
PKIP.  In contrast, the Witte (1963) model would suggest that investment 
is a positive function of  P,IP.  The difference is one of  demand versus 
supply. The Witte model is a supply function of  producers of  capital 
goods, which we expect to  find upward-sloping in PK and inversely related 
to the general level of  costs for capital goods producers which might be 
measured by P. If we estimated the Salinger-Summers investment func- 
tion with Q based on V/(PKK),  we would have to ask what identijies the 
investment function here. For the Salinger-Summers demand for invest- 
ment function to be identified, it would have to be the case that some 
other variables influence supply, and for proper consistent estimation of 
the investment demand function we would need these variables as instru- 
ments. Ordinary least squares would be biased, the extent of  the bias 
depending on the relative magnitudes of demand versus supply shocks. 
The coefficient in the investment function could be so biased as to have 
the wrong sign, if  shocks to the adjustment cost function cause corre- 
sponding moves in the price of  capital goods and hence opposite moves in 
Q. In practice, the Salinger-Summers model, which uses P rather than 
PK, does not allow this effect. 
The regression results for 1964-78  in table 8.2 often look very good 
when one considers how simple the model is. Of  the twenty-eight firms, 
twenty-five had slope coefficients with the right sign. In most cases, the R2 
is around 0.4. In contrast, in Summers’s earlier paper (1981), which used 
aggregate investment data from 1930 to 1978, the R2  was only 0.046, 
while the  coefficient of 0.013 is actually larger than the coefficient of 0.010 
estimated in this paper in the pooled regression. Perhaps  the higher R2  in 
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independent variable Q. Some firms do very badly (e.g. Chrysler stock 
had a nearly steady decline over the period 1964-78), and others do very 
well (IBM stock rose dramatically). 
The coefficients in the regression have a simple interpretation. The 
time variation in Q is due primarily to time variation in the price of  the 
firm (which is why the table 8.3 regressions cannot tell whether Q or q 
belongs, since the two variables are fairly collinear). In the absence of 
taxes, Q = q -  1,  where q is Tobin’s q.  In the presence of taxes, aggregate 
Q is roughly equal to 2q -  1  (though this approximation works poorly in 
explaining the cross-firm variation in Q shown in table 8.1). Suppose Q 
moves from 0 to 1  because the price of the firm, which had been equal to 
?4  the value of the capital, had doubled. Then the predicted change in IK 
is equal to the coefficient in the regression. Thus an estimated coefficient 
of 0.02 implies that the firm whose price doubled will increase in size by 
only 2%  per year. Inverting the investment cost function, we find that 
marginal adjustment costs as a function of  I increase by  a factor of  50 
when Z doubles. 
Why are the estimated coefficients so small? The first explanation 
which comes to mind is that there are really decreasing returns to scale for 
the individual firms. Other sources of estimation bias may be involved. I 
am also inclined to imagine that stock prices may be vulnerable to “fads” 
or the like, and that firm managers who decide on earnings retention do 
not see their true shadow price of  capital in the market price. 
The paper performs simulations of the effects on the value of the firm V 
and on investment I of several tax reforms: indexation, reduction in the 
corporate tax  rate, and acceleration  of  depreciation. As the authors 
acknowledge, the “procedure cannot be justified within the model.” The 
model implies that in order to predict the impact on V the authors must 
return to making stability assumptions of the kind which the investment 
function  approach here obviated. They must  make some assumption 
about the effect on macroeconomic variables, the discount rate, the level 
of  demand, and the wage rate. In turn, they would then have to make 
assumptions about firm production functions and solve the intertemporal 
optimization problem after the tax reform to get the new V.  Summers 
discussed such simulations in his earlier paper. In this paper they are less 
ambitious or more realistic. A key feature of their argument is their claim 
that, since the coefficient in the investment function is small, the effect on 
future revenues is small. For the purpose of the simulation, future pretax 
profits are assumed to continue on a growth path, unchanged by  the 
reform, discount rates are assumed to be constant, and tax policy changes 
are assumed to be permanent. These simulations are in the nature of 
simple “back of  the envelope” calculations. While the avowed purpose 
here is to simulate the effects of tax changes which are permanent and 
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simulation would be vulnerable to a rational expectationist criticism. If 
tax changes are perceived  as temporary i.e. are generated by  a policy 
rule, the impact on V and Z  could be greatly misstated. In contrast, the 
advantage of  the investment function studied here is that investment 
depends only on current tax parameters and V regardless of  expectations 
about future taxes because information about these future taxes is in- 
corporated in V.  In the simulation methodology used here, such informa- 
tion would not be incorporated in V. 
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